Metaphysics

Metaphysics isbranchphilosophy. Itnotoriously difficultdefine, butpurposesbriefly introducing itnonphilosophers,can be identified asstudyany ofmost fundamental conceptsbeliefs, on which many other conceptsbeliefs rest--concepts such as being, existence, universal, property, relation, causation, space, time, event,many others.

Part oftroubledefining metaphysics lieshow muchfield has changed sincefirst received its name by Aristotle's editors centuries ago. (See belowan explanationwhat metaphysics first meant.). Problems that were not originally considered metaphysical were addedmetaphysics. Other problems that werecenturies considered metaphysical problemsnow typically relegatedtheir own separate subheadingsphilosophy such as philosophyreligion, philosophymind, philosophyperception, philosophylanguage,philosophyscience. It would require quitelong timestate allproblems that have, at one time or another, been considered partmetaphysics.

What might be calledcore metaphysical problems would beones which have always been considered metaphysicalwhich have never been considered not metaphysical. What mostsuch problems havecommonthatareproblemsontology, "the sciencebeing qua being" (seeontology articlean explanationwhat this means).

The origin ofword 'metaphysics'

The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle wrotenumberbooks which together were calledPhysics. In an early edition,worksAristotle were organizedsuchway that there was another setbooks that were placed right afterPhysics. These books seemedconcernbasic, fundamental areaphilosophical inquiry, which attime did not havename. So early Aristotle scholars called those books "ta meta ta physika," which means "the (books that come) after(books about) physics." That, then, isorigin ofword 'metaphysics'.

Hence, etymologically speaking, metaphysics issubjectthose books by Aristotle which were called, collectively,Metaphysics. So, etymologically, 'metaphysics' just means 'the subject matterAristotle's Metaphysics'.

What were those books by Aristotle about? The Metaphysics was divided into three parts, called (1) ontology, (2) theology,(3) universal science. (There were also some smaller, perhaps tangential matters:philosophical lexicon, an attemptdefine philosophygeneral,several extracts fromPhysics repeated verbatim.) So ontology, theology,universal scienceregarded asthree traditional branchesmetaphysics. (1) 'Ontology' isstudyexistence;has been traditionally defined as 'the sciencebeing qua being'. (2) 'Theology' means, here,studyGod orgods andquestions aboutdivine. (3) 'Universal science'supposedbestudyso-called first principless, which underlie all other inquiries; an examplesuchprinciple islawnon-contradiction: "Acannot both benot be atsame time,insame respect." A particular apple cannot both existnot exist atsame time. It can't be all redall green atsame time. So that wasAristotelian conceptionmetaphysics. Universal science or first philosophy treats"being qua being"--that is, whatbasisall science before one addsparticular detailsany one science. This includes matters like causality, substance, species,elements.

Tablecontents

1 Examples
2 Metaphysical subdisciplines
3 Metaphysical topicsproblems
4 Metaphysical jargon
5 See also

Examples

Itsometimes difficultunderstand whatissues even are,metaphysics. It might helpbegin withfairly simple example that will helpintroduceproblemsmetaphysics.

Imagine now that weinroom,inmiddle ofroom there istable,inmiddle oftable there isbig, fresh, juicy, red apple. We can ask many metaphysical questions about this apple. This will, hopefully, help us understand better what metaphysics is.

The applean excellent example ofphysical object: one can pickup, throwaround, eat it,so on. It occupies spacetimehasvarietyproperties. Suppose we ask: what are physical objects? This might seem likesortquestionwhich one cannot give an answer. What could one possibly useexplain what physical objects are? But philosophers actually do trygive some general sortsaccountswhatare. They ask: Are physical objects just bundlestheir properties? Orthey substances which have those properties? Thatcalledproblemsubstance or objecthood.

Hereanother sortquestion. We said thatapple has properties, like being red, being big, being juicy. Howproperties different from objects? Notice, we say that things like apples have properties like redness. But applesrednessdifferent sortsitems,things,entities. One can pick uptouch an apple, but cannot pick uptouch redness, except perhaps insense that you can pick uptouch red things. So how can we best think about what properties are? Thiscalled the problemuniversals.

Hereanother question about what physical objects are: when in general can we say that physical objects come into beingwhencease to exist? Surelyapple can changemany ways without ceasingexist. It could get brownrotten butwould still be that apple. But if someone ate it,would not just have changed;would no longer exist. So theresome metaphysical questionsbe answered aboutnotionsidentity, or beingsameover time,change.

This apple existsspace (it sits ontable inroom)in time (it was not ontableweek agoit will not be ontableweek from now). But what does this talkspacetime mean? Can we say,example, that spacelike an invisible three-dimensional gridwhichapplelocated? Supposeapple,every other physical object inuniverse werebe entirely removed from existence: then would space, that "invisible grid," still exist? Some people say not--they say that without physical objects, space would not exist, because space isframeworkwhich we understand how physical objectsrelatedeach other. Theremany other metaphysical questionsask about spacetime.

Theresome other, very different sortsproblemsmetaphysics. The appleone sortthing; now if Sallyinroom,we say Sally hasmind, wesurely goingsay that Sally's mind isdifferent sortthing fromapple (ifissortthing at all). I might say that my mindimmaterial, butapple ismaterial object. Moreover,soundslittle strangesay that Sally's mindlocatedany particular place; maybe we could say itsomewhere inroom; butappleobviously located inparticular place, namely onmiddle oftable. It seems clear that mindsfundamentally different from physical bodies. But if so, how can something mental, likedecisioneat, causephysical eventoccur, like biting down onapple? How aremindbody causally interconnected if theytwo totally different sortsthings? Thiscalledmind-body problem, whichnow typically relegated tophilosophical subdiscipline called philosophymind. The mind-body problemsometimes still considered partmetaphysics, however.

Those, then,some examplesmetaphysical problems. Theremany more problems,course.

Metaphysical subdisciplines

Thesefields now or traditionally treated as partmetaphysics:

Metaphysical topicsproblems

Identitychange

Metaphysical jargon

abstract -- being -- categorybeing -- concrete ...etc.!